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Response 
The Functions of Ethical Originalism 
Richard Primus* 
Supreme Court Justices frequently divide on questions of original 
meaning, and the divisions have a way of mapping what we might suspect 
are the Justices’ leanings about the merits of cases irrespective of originalist 
considerations.  The same is true for law professors and other participants in 
constitutional discourse: people’s views of original constitutional meaning 
tend to align well with their (nonoriginalist) preferences for how present 
constitutional controversies should be resolved.  To be sure, there are 
exceptions.  Some people are better than others at suspending presentist 
considerations when examining historical materials, and some people are 
better than others at recognizing when a historical text taken on its own terms 
cannot support their own desired perspectives.  But within American 
constitutional discourse, the prevailing tendency runs in the other direction.  
Despite the common claim that originalism constrains decisionmaking, 
people who disagree about constitutional issues tend to enact their 
disagreement in the realm of original meaning, as well as in the other realms 
of constitutional argument.1 
One might suspect, then, that different contenders in constitutional cases 
endorse different views of original meaning precisely so as to support their 
desired outcomes in those cases.2  But for reasons that Jamal Greene helps 
 
 * Professor of Law, The University of Michigan; John Simon Guggenheim Memorial 
Foundation Fellow in Constitutional Studies.  I thank Jamal Greene for initiating this discussion and 
Alex Christopher for a cromulent intervention. 
1.  See Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 171 (2009) 
(cataloging recent instances in which the Supreme Court has divided in this manner). 
2. This view of the matter need not sound in cynical instrumentalism.  To be sure, it is possible 
to imagine a litigant saying to himself, “The historical sources are open textured, and I want to win 
this case, so I will argue that the original meaning is X, even though the sources could equally well 
support Y.”  But for most scholars and judges, and probably for most other participants in the 
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make visible, that view would understate the stakes of originalist argument.3  
Greene suggests that arguments about original meaning should be understood 
as a form of what Philip Bobbitt called ethical argument, meaning not “moral 
argument” but argument about the American constitutional ethos.4  I share 
this view.  To be sure, much originalist argument is officially presented in the 
register of legal positivism.  The reason why the federal government is 
limited in its authority to regulate firearms, such an argument might run, is 
that the founding generation imparted specific content to the Second 
Amendment through the ratification process, and that content is the law of 
the Constitution until it is changed through the appropriate process for 
amendment.  But the deeper power of originalist argument sounds in the 
romance of national identity.  Whether originalist arguments have purchase 
depends less on the accuracy of their historical accounts—or the plausibility 
of their theories of intertemporal authority—than on whether their audiences 
recognize themselves, or perhaps their idealized selves, in the portrait of 
American origins that is on offer.  To return to the Second Amendment 
example, the force of the originalist arguments that the Supreme Court 
credited in District of Columbia v. Heller5 is not primarily a function of 
whether historical evidence suggests that the Amendment was originally 
understood as a federalism measure or a matter of individual rights, and it is 
largely untouched by the dead-hand problem.  But it depends heavily on 
whether twenty-first-century Americans (and in particular twenty-first-
century American officials) are disposed to see the keeping and use of 
firearms as near the core of what makes them Americans and what connects 
them to the American past.  As a matter of form, the winning argument in 
Heller is originalist.  Its substance and its persuasive power are matters of 
ethos. 
Classifying originalist arguments as ethical requires expanding the 
category of ethos beyond Bobbitt’s own usage, though perhaps not beyond 
his abstract description of the category.  According to Bobbitt’s formulation 
in Constitutional Fate, “ethical argument” is “constitutional argument whose 
force relies on a characterization of American institutions and the role within 
them of the American people.”6  Taken at that level of generality, the 
 
system, the fact that originalist interpretations tend to support the interpreters’ own preferred 
positions is more likely a matter of motivated reasoning than of deliberate manipulation.  That is, 
people with strong preferences about present controversies might be drawn to accept some accounts 
of original meaning more readily than others, even if they do not experience themselves as cavalier 
with the history on its own terms.  Given that historical sources regularly lend themselves to 
multiple interpretations, a little bit of motivated reasoning will often be enough to let someone settle 
on one interpretation rather than another. 
3. Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (2009). 
4. Id. at 82–88; see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 93–119 (1982). 
5. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
6. BOBBITT, supra note 4, at 94. 
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category would include any originalist arguments in which the gravamen was 
a claim about the nature of American institutions and the American people at 
the founding—and, implicitly, since.  That said, Bobbitt himself has pressed 
a more substantively specific conception of ethical argument.  In 
Constitutional Fate, Bobbitt presented ethical arguments as arising not from 
any claim about American institutions and the American people but from one 
particular characterization: that ours is a limited government.7  In subsequent 
work, Bobbitt has written that the idea of self-government can also give rise 
to ethical arguments in constitutional law.8  But even so, Bobbitt’s treatments 
of ethical argument posit or derive a particular substantive ethos—limited 
government, or self-government—and then regard as ethical arguments from 
that conception. 
Greene approaches the category of ethical argument in a way that does 
not presume, or argue for, any particular conception of the American 
constitutional ethos.  That seems reasonable.  Just as doctrinal argument is 
argument about the content of constitutional doctrine, ethical argument can 
be argument about the content of the constitutional ethos.  And the American 
ethos is very much a subject of contest in constitutional law:9 the content of 
our ethos is part of what we are arguing about.  Bobbitt’s claim that the 
fundamental constitutional ethos is about limited government can be 
understood as a move within that contest—that is, as an instance of ethical 
argument—rather than as exhausting the category. 
As Greene keenly appreciates, historical narrative is one of the leading 
ways in which claims about ethos are articulated.10  To put it Greekily, ethos 
and mythos are closely joined.  Many historical arguments—specifically, 
those that aim to persuade their audiences to accept a given sense of the 
constitutional ethos—can therefore be profitably understood as ethical 
arguments.  “Historical argument” is one of Bobbitt’s modalities alongside 
“ethical argument,”11 and someone taking a wooden approach to the typology 
 
7. See id. at 230. 
8. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 64–82 (1991); Philip Bobbitt, 
Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 1869, 1937 (1994).  That said, Bobbitt may 
continue to hold the view that the ethos of limited government is more powerful.  See Philip 
Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1284 (1989) (“The fundamental American 
Constitutional ethos is the idea of limited government.”); Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on 
John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1393 (1994) (book review) (identifying both limited government and self-
government as within the constitutional ethos but describing the ethos of limited government as 
“fundamental”). 
9. See, e.g., Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 
30 (1990) (explaining that the Court’s “embrace of the value of racial equality [in Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),] could have been a misreading of the national ethos” and “came close 
to failing precisely because that ethos was in fact so divided”). 
10. See Greene, supra note 3, at 84. 
11. BOBBITT, supra note 4, at 9–24. 
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offered in Constitutional Fate might classify originalist arguments that do 
not arise from the idea of limited government (or self-government) as 
historical rather than ethical.  But there is no need to insist on a rigorous 
separation of historical arguments from ethical ones (and on this point, 
Bobbitt would surely agree).  So Greene’s characterization of much 
originalist argument as ethical is a fair expansion of Bobbitt’s category and 
in some respects an improvement upon it. 
If originalist argument is often a form of ethical argument, then the 
stakes of originalist argument can go well beyond any particular case in 
which originalist arguments are made.  The core question addressed by 
ethical argument is who Americans are as a people, and the struggle over that 
issue is a central contest of constitutional law.  Moreover, that contest is not 
pursued only for the sake of establishing a platform from which to decide 
concrete cases.  The content of our national ethos is also contested for 
something like its own sake, as a source of independent value.  Most 
participants in American constitutional discourse want being American to 
mean some things and not others.  For similar reasons, most participants 
want American history to be, or to mean, some things rather than others.  Just 
as the character of a person might be revealed by the story of his life, the 
character of the American people is understood to be revealed by the story of 
their past.  So if originalist argument is ethical argument, the stakes are never 
just about the case at hand. 
In what follows, I identify three functions of ethical-originalist 
argument that go beyond the realm of deciding particular cases.  First, 
originalist argument can establish the content of American history as a value 
in itself.  Second, it can help to legitimate the constitutional system by 
creating an affinity between the present generation and the generation of 
heroic constitution makers.  Third, it can establish a particular speaker as the 
authoritative bearer of the American constitutional tradition, thus 
empowering him to arbitrate questions in the name of that tradition.  These 
functions of ethical-originalist argument often overlap, and they all overlap 
with the more quotidian business of using originalist argument to justify 
particular decisions.  But even when a particular speaker aims only at 
deciding a given case—or establishing a rule of decision that will decide 
cases of a certain kind—originalist arguments that sound in national ethos 
can execute the other three functions as well. 
I. Function 1: History as a Value 
In American constitutional culture, people struggle over the content of 
American history as if they derived value from the simple fact of the story’s 
being one thing rather than another.  We are invested in the history, so we 
have preferences about its content irrespective of whether that content bears 
directly on issues of our own day.  Most of us want the founders of the 
2010] Response 83 
 
 
republic and various other actors in constitutional history to have been 
honorable and intelligent rather than scoundrels and knaves.  We want the 
story of the Constitution to begin with great promise, and if we recognize 
that the original Constitution was not perfect, we want the story of American 
constitutional development to be one of better choices over time, gradually 
working the Constitution pure and redeeming the initial promise.  Again, 
there are exceptions.  But as a general matter, even people critical of existing 
constitutional arrangements are sufficiently invested in the goodness of the 
Constitution’s history so as to think of themselves as redeemers of an earlier 
vision rather than as rejecting the Constitution and its tradition. 
The preference for an uplifting view of constitutional history is rooted 
in part in the fact that participants in the constitutional system today are in a 
sense characters in the Constitution’s continuing story and, therefore, the 
successors in interest of the characters from previous generations.  That 
positioning creates a sense that who they were reflects on us, much as many 
of us have the sense that our family forebears reflect on us.  Most people 
want their great-grandparents to have been honorable men and women, even 
if they never met them.  Given the choice of which of two stories about our 
predecessors to accept as true, most of us would prefer the one that casts 
them in a favorable light.12  And we want the overall story, in which we are 
eventually characters, to be a story that we like. 
That said, we have different ideas about what kind of story is likable.  
We have, one might say, differing historical preferences, meaning not 
preferences in the past but preferences about the past.  Were the founders 
skeptics or Christians?  Was the Civil War a crusade against slavery, or was 
the slavery gloss peripheral to a struggle for brute sectional power?  Many of 
us care about the answers even apart from whatever might follow for twenty-
first-century legal outcomes.  We care because some tellings make it easier 
than others for us to identify with our predecessors, or to think them 
praiseworthy, or because they make us (rather than our contemporary rivals) 
into the legitimate bearers of the noble past, or simply because we have heard 
the story in particular ways since childhood and value what is familiar. 
Originalist argument is in part a way of claiming that American 
constitutional history is the story we want it to be.  To be sure, presentist 
consequences can flow from fixing the story one way rather than another.  
But the promise of those consequences does not exhaust the appeal of being 
able to establish the story according to one’s liking.  We value the story on 
its own terms, or because of how it makes us feel about ourselves given our 
 
12. See, e.g., The Simpsons: Lisa the Iconoclast (Fox television broadcast Feb. 18, 1996) 
(presenting a situation in which Lisa discovers that town founder Jebediah Springfield was actually 
a vicious pirate rather than a pioneer hero but also realizes that the people of the town derive 
immense value from their positive image of Jebediah and therefore does not correct the historical 
record). 
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relationship to it.  And because we have differing preferences about what the 
story should be, we argue about the content of the history. 
II. Function 2: Constitutional Legitimacy 
Investment in the history for something like its own sake is reflected in 
the following underappreciated feature of originalism: originalism is fun.  
For most constitutional lawyers—a category in which I mean to include 
judges and law professors—the process of engaging with America’s 
constitution writers and imagining what they would have to say about the 
problems we face today is highly enjoyable.  For many, it is downright 
thrilling.  The core framers are heroes and celebrities, and the project of 
identifying original meanings asks us to stand in their shoes.  It is no wonder 
that so many people like doing it. 
Thinking of originalist argument as an activity in which twenty-first-
century Americans get to imagine themselves in the role of the founders 
might seem trivializing.  It suggests that arguing about the original meaning 
of Article II is like playing Guitar Hero—and in some ways it is.  But 
something deeper is also going on.  Enabling citizens and officials to identify 
with the major figures of their national political traditions serves important 
civic functions.  It encourages them to relate to the governing regime as their 
own, rather than as something alien or imposed.  That attitude toward 
government is an important element of legitimacy. 
Two central features of American government make discursive 
opportunities to identify with the makers of the system especially important.  
The first, which is mostly a function of the sheer size of the polity even at the 
state level,13 is that few citizens have the opportunity to feel ownership of the 
regime through actual proximate impact on policymaking.  The second is that 
the Constitution is very old.  As is well understood, an inherited Constitution 
that is extremely difficult to amend is a form of government that people now 
living do not really have the opportunity to accept or reject.  This is the 
familiar dead-hand problem in constitutional law.14  Without some way of 
 
13. According to the 2000 census, more than 85% of Americans live in states whose 
populations are larger than the entire United States population was at the time of the ratification of 
the Constitution.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATES RANKED BY POPULATION (2001), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t2/tables/tab01.pdf.  The proportion of 
modern Americans who live in states whose electorates are larger than the entire United States 
electorate was at the time of ratification is, of course, even larger.  Compare FED. ELECTION 
COMM’N, DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTORAL VOTES, http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm, with 
FIRST CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (1790), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1790b-02.pdf (summarizing the population of 
individual states and territories). 
14. The dead-hand problem defeats any claim that the Constitution is legitimately binding today 
on the basis of its democratic enactment, but it does not defeat the Constitution’s claim to 
legitimacy overall, because constitutional legitimacy is not founded on democratic enactment alone.  
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bridging the gap between the twenty-first century and times long before, the 
gap in time between the constitution makers and the people who are 
governed could foster a sense of alienation. 
Arguing constitutional questions in originalist terms helps to allay some 
of the anxieties that the dead-hand problem might otherwise raise because it 
seems to collapse the distance between Americans today and the generations 
that wrote and revised the Constitution.  From a practical perspective, it is 
often hard to understand why the best way to approach the problems of 
twenty-first-century governance would be through the ideas of James 
Madison or John Bingham.  Capable as they were, neither Madison nor 
Bingham could think concretely about the issue presented in, say, Citizens 
United v. FEC,15 because neither of them had knowledge of twenty-first-
century political campaigns, corporate governance, and mass-market 
advertising.  But if we argue our most pressing issues as if their ideas were 
relevant, we can seem to elide the difference between their world and ours.  
We create in ourselves a sense of intertemporal community: in every 
generation, constitutional lawyers see themselves as if they had been at 
Philadelphia. 
This is not an unequivocally good thing.  For starters, imagining 
ourselves as engaged in the founders’ own conversation does nothing to 
make their ideas any more helpful for the instrumental task of finding the 
best regime for, say, the regulation of corporate money in politics under the 
conditions of 2010.  In the worst-case scenario, our analysis of the question 
would be substantively distorted by the introduction of inapposite ideas.  Nor 
does the fact that arguing in originalist terms might help us worry less about 
the dead-hand problem mean that it offers to solve that problem.  Talking as 
if the founders were less removed from us than they actually are does not 
alter the fact that the written Constitution is an artifact of times now gone.  
But if engaging in originalist argument does not solve that problem, it may 
nonetheless alleviate some of the anxieties that focusing on that problem 
might otherwise raise.  So for better or for worse, the activity has an enduring 
attraction. 
If one of the functions of originalist argument is to foster identification 
with the constitutional regime, it matters whether the content of original 
constitutional meanings resonates with people today.  If we engaged the 
ideas of Madison and Bingham and found them alien, or worse yet repulsive, 
then trafficking in original meanings would be a poor strategy for making us 
feel that the Constitution they wrote is authentically ours as well.  In the 
actual practice of constitutional argument, this problem rarely arises: 
lawyers, judges, and professors have a way of finding that originalist sources 
 
See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 192–202 
(2008). 
15. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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underwrite constitutional meanings that they find attractive.  There are 
exceptions, of course.  Trashing the founders is a known academic genre.  
But it is rare in public discourse, virtually unknown in litigation, and a niche 
pursuit even in the academy.  In the main, constitutional lawyers who argue 
from original meanings tend to conclude that the founders were just like us, 
at least to the extent of valuing what the speaker thinks we value, or should 
value.  Originalist argument thus helps legitimize the constitutional regime 
by creating a sense of national ethos that is continuous from the founders to 
our own time. 
III. Function 3: Authority and Authenticity 
Finally, originalist argument can help establish a particular speaker as 
an authoritative arbiter of the constitutional tradition.  The authority to speak 
in the name of the tradition is not simply something that attaches to offices.  
Occupying certain offices helps, and the office of Supreme Court Justice 
helps more than most.  But there is no uniform quantum of authority to speak 
in the name of the tradition that is allocated to all justices equally.  Who has 
more and who has less is partly a matter of the different ways in which 
different justices enact their relationships to constitutional history and, in 
turn, how the audience of constitutional lawyers processes those different 
ways of enacting the relationship. 
One effective way for a justice to position himself as an authoritative 
arbiter of the American constitutional tradition is to speak confidently about 
the values of the founders.  A justice who systematically presents his work 
product as the fulfillment of the founders’ vision bids to establish his own 
role as apostolic.  Indeed, a justice who successfully persuades his audience 
that the spirit of constitutional history moves within him is likely to enhance 
his own authority to decide issues in accordance with his own vision even 
when he cannot adduce direct support from statements of the founding 
generation.  And the most successful forms of originalist argument for this 
purpose are broad claims that sound clearly in national ethos, rather than 
measured historical reconstructions that are limited to the technical 
particulars of positive authority. 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,16 for 
example, was a masterpiece of ethical argument.  Broadly and confidently, it 
spun out the meaning of what the founding generation did in creating the 
Constitution.17  Chief Justice Marshall was a member of that generation, of 
course, and he participated personally in the Virginia Ratifying Convention.  
 
16. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
17. See Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 125 
(2006) (opining that “Marshall cast such a powerful spell that M’Culloch has displaced the views of 
the Framers as the authoritative source on the scope of Congress’s power”). 
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But his authority to speak for the whole generation is less a product of that 
participation than it is of his telling the story later on.  After all, his 
participation in the founding generation does not differentiate him from a 
host of other people, many of whom had different views from his about the 
Bank of the United States and a large number of related constitutional 
questions.18 
Consider also the example of Justice Brandeis describing the founders’ 
attitudes toward free speech.  “Those who won our independence by 
revolution were not cowards,” Justice Brandeis declared in his famous 
Whitney19 concurrence, but rather “courageous, self-reliant men, with 
confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning.”20  The tone is broad 
and confident, and the picture is general.  A careful historian might cringe at 
the lack of nuance, but there is a reason why Justice Brandeis did not write, 
“Those who won our independence by revolution were, mostly, not cowards, 
though of course there are a few cowards in any large group.  Most of them 
most of the time were confident in the power of free reasoning, even though 
many of them were less so, and some would have been willing, in certain 
circumstances, to impose restrictions.” 
At one level, Justice Brandeis was making an argument about the First 
Amendment.  But he was also instructing his audience in a general vision of 
the founders and, simultaneously, a vision of Justice Brandeis as someone 
who knew, easily and intuitively, what the founders were all about.  Note that 
Justice Brandeis named no particular founders and adduced no particular 
historical evidence for his claim about their character and worldview.  None 
was needed.  Part of the point, after all, was that he, Justice Brandeis, had 
sufficient access to what was important about the relevant historical story. 
Among the sitting Justices, Justice Kennedy seems to have a 
particularly strong sense of confidence in himself as a bearer of the American 
constitutional tradition.  He is comfortable making broad pronouncements 
about the meaning of America and the arc of its history, and he generally 
does so without the sense of ambiguity and contingency that a more 
disciplinary approach to history might involve.  His recent invocation of the 
founders’ views of free speech in Citizens United v. FEC was more compact 
than Justice Brandeis’s in Whitney, but it was no less general, no less robust, 
and no more a matter of having to struggle with historical nuance.  “At the 
founding,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “speech was open, comprehensive, and 
 
18. This is not to say that Marshall’s argument does its work by its own force alone.  As is true 
of argumentative texts generally, success requires not just something about the text but also 
something about the audience, and there have been periods in history when the orientation of the 
dominant audience denied the McCulloch opinion the revered place that it now holds.  See 
Magliocca, supra note 19, at 124–34. 
19. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
20. Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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vital to society’s definition of itself; there were no limits on the sources of 
speech and knowledge.”21  That is a picture of an ethos.  And if there were 
any doubt that Justice Kennedy’s opinion offered an image of the ethos of 
America not just at the founding but through time, one might note that the 
opinion invokes not just a general image of wide-open-eighteenth-century 
speech but also the Jimmy Stewart movie Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.22 
At one level, Justice Kennedy’s view of founding-era speech was 
offered to justify the decision that Congress may not ban corporations and 
unions from making political expenditures.  But more is at stake in Justice 
Kennedy’s relationship to the founders than either the outcome of Citizens 
United or the more general question of the limits of the First Amendment.  If 
some constitutional actors regularly and confidently advance broad ethical 
arguments about the founding and others do not, the latter group risks ceding 
the role of Vicars of the Constitution.  The power to speak in the name of the 
founding is a tool that belongs to those who use it. 
IV. Conclusion: The Limits of Ethos 
Greene’s suggestion that originalist argument is largely ethical can be 
broadened.  Perhaps much textual argument, too, is best understood in the 
register of ethos.  This may be so in two different ways.  First, textual 
argument is in part a way in which constitutional actors advance and defend 
claims about ethos, just as originalist argument is.  That much is simply a 
result, once again, of the fact that ethos is a large part of what constitutional 
argument is substantively about.  But also like originalist argument, textual 
argument is a practice through which Americans enact an important piece of 
the constitutional ethos.  Making originalist arguments is a way in which we 
enact our sense of connection to the founding; making textualist arguments is 
a way in which we enact our sense of ourselves as governed by a written 
document.  Very few Supreme Court cases are actually decided by reference 
to the words of the text, but our enacted attitude toward textual argument 
both reflects and embodies a central part of our constitutional ethos. 
At least two of our most hallowed forms of constitutional argument—
text and history—are thus not just vehicles for advancing claims about ethos.  
They are also discursive practices through which the constitutional ethos is 
enacted.  Once we notice that fact, it is instructive to think further about 
which forms of constitutional argument are not practices through which 
Americans enact their constitutional ethos.  Doctrinal argument may or may 
not be, depending on the case and the context; prudential argument is almost 
certainly not; neither, I think, are more hard-headed arguments about the 
practical functioning of governance.  Those modes of reasoning might have a 
 
21. Id. at 906. 
22. Id. at 916. 
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greater tendency to yield pragmatically helpful answers about how to govern 
a complex society in the twenty-first century—if only we were good at them, 
of course.  To be sure, those modes of reasoning cannot answer many 
questions of value.  But questions of value are only part of what 
constitutional law must resolve. 
To some extent, therefore, the prominent place of ethical-originalist 
argument in constitutional law is regrettable.  Officials might make better 
decisions about consequential issues of governance if they were not 
simultaneously engaged in a gauzier contest about national identity.  But as a 
matter of practice, constitutional discourse is partly that gauzier contest.  To 
the extent that it is, originalist arguments are doing more than using history 
to settle twenty-first-century questions of law.  We may capture the 
phenomenon better by saying that twenty-first-century questions provide 
opportunities for articulating rival visions of the past.  And once we adopt 
that perspective, it should be no surprise that people with different 
constitutional values find different meanings in originalist history, rather than 
being able to refer to historical sources to settle contested questions.  The 
history, after all, is what they are contesting. 
